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INTRODUCTION
The Seventh Circuit, in its recent decision, In re Slave
Descendants Litigation, dismissed the claims of plaintiffs seeking
disgorgement of the profits earned by Northern companies as a result
of their illegal involvement in slavery.1 It is the latest in a long line of
reparations cases dismissed by courts for various reasons, including
lack of standing and statute of limitations.
Part One of this Comment outlines the history of Northern
involvement in slavery. Part Two traces the legal hurdles faced by
African American plaintiffs during and after the statutory time period
in which to bring reparations claims. Part Three explores the law of
reparations, and the relevant case law. Part Four of this Comment
delineates the holdings of the district court and the Seventh Circuit
opinion in Slave Descendants. Part Five explains the various tolling
doctrines available to courts to remedy time-barred claims. Part Six
*

J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. 2000, Swarthmore College.
1
In re African American Slave Descendants Litigation (“Slave Descendants”),
471 F.3d 754, 763 (7th Cir. 2006).
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outlines the manner in which the court should have applied the
standard for equitable estoppel, and the considerations of efficiency,
equity, and history such an application would have satisfied.
I. NORTHERN INVOLVEMENT IN SLAVERY
Slavery was an incredibly profitable endeavor that supported
America’s economy in its infancy.2 However, many Americans are not
aware of the North’s extensive involvement in slavery. To remedy that
knowledge gap, Hartford Courant reporters Anne Farrow, Joel Lang,
and Jenifer Frank recently published Complicity: How the North
Promoted, Prolonged, and Profited from Slavery.3 In it, they chronicle
the history of slavery in the North as well as the involvement of
Northern companies in slavery. Though most people know that
farmers and plantation owners in Southern states enslaved Africans
and their descendants, the Northern system of slavery is far less
infamous. In the 1760s, residents of Northern states, including New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, owned and housed as
many as 41,000 Africans.4 Just as their Southern counterparts did,
Northern slave owners bought and sold their slaves, separating
children from parents and husbands from wives. Northern slaves slept
on floors in attics, cellars, and barns, without blankets or clothing,
where conditions were far colder than in the South.5 They could not
freely travel, associate or educate themselves under the law.6 Slave
owners routinely whipped slaves of all ages for violating these rules,
or for any number of other reasons, and received no punishment for
murdering a slave.7
2

Burt Neuborne, Holocaust Reparations Litigation: Lessons for the Slavery
Reparations Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 615, 620 (2003).
3
ANNE FARROW, ET AL., COMPLICITY: HOW THE NORTH PROMOTED,
PROLONGED, AND PROFITED FROM SLAVERY (2006).
4
Id. at 62.
5
Id at 63.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 62.
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At the same time, Northern slave trading posts supplied the
demands of Northern residents for slaves.8 Rhode Island had a virtual
monopoly on the “importation” of slaves, and controlled more than
two-thirds of the American colonies’ slave trade with Africa.9 After
Congress banned the trafficking of African slaves in 1808, Rhode
Island continued to import slaves.10 As late as 1860, after the slave
trade in Rhode Island had waned, New York City was the American
capital of a massive international illegal slave trade, supplying slaves
to markets in Brazil and Cuba.11 New Yorkers built and sold slave
ships designed to transport 600 to 1000 people each; the ships
contained crates of shackles and large water tanks.12 Slave traders
generally evaded prosecution or bribed juries if indicted.13 When a
Northern court convicted one notorious New York slave trader in
1861, 11,000 of his outraged fellow New Yorkers petitioned Abraham
Lincoln to pardon him.
II. AFRICAN AMERICAN ACCESS TO COURT SYSTEMS
While the Civil War unequivocally changed America, it did not
ameliorate slavery’s effects. The composition of the Union army
evidenced the change. By 1865, one out of every four Union soldiers
was African American—either Northern free blacks or escaped
slaves.14 In the antebellum South, these same soldiers did not enjoy
what was termed in the nineteenth century “the basic rights of
personhood under the law.”15 Blacks were excluded from the right to
marry, follow trade, travel, own land or property, enter into contracts,
8

Id. at 95.
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id at 112.
12
Id. at 121
13
Id. at 122.
14
GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 20 (2006).
15
Id. at 31.
9
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testify in court, and seek judicial remedy.16 The Framers of the
Constitution viewed these civil rights as more fundamental than
political rights. Political rights included the right to serve on juries and
the right to vote, and the Framers granted political rights only to white
land-owning men.17 This hierarchy of rights endured through the Civil
War and into Reconstruction, where a reunified America countenanced
at most only fundamental civil rights for African Americans.18 Though
the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery in 1865, Southern States
adopted “Black Codes” in response that denied blacks the citizenship
rights granted to them by the Thirteenth Amendment.19 Congress
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to grant civil rights to African
Americans, notwithstanding strong dispute from formerly Confederate
states and several Northern states, including New Jersey, Ohio, and
Oregon.20
In 1873, The Supreme Court confronted the Fourteenth
Amendment in The Slaughter-House Cases.21 The Court narrowly
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee only federal
enforcement of the privileges and immunities of citizenship, but left
states free to determine the citizenship status of its residents
individually.22 The Court restricted the power of the Fourteenth
Amendment further in the 1883 Civil Rights Cases.23 There the court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment barred only discrimination in
state action, but that private racial discrimination was an unprotected
social matter.24 The Court thus granted judicial approval to the
16

Id.
Id.
18
Id. at 31-32.
19
Norman Redlich, “Out, Damned Spot; Out, I Say.” The Persistence of Race
In American Law. 25 VT. L. REV. 475, 484 (2001).
20
Id. at 240-253.
21
83 U.S. 36 (1873).
22
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Brown to Tulsa: Defining Our Own Future, 47
HOW. L. J. 499, 501 (2004).
23
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
24
Id.
17
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division between civil, political, and social rights, protecting only the
most fundamental of civil rights for blacks.25 This approach was
sanctioned by Congress, since many of its members from both the
North and South were uncomfortable with the concept of African
Americans as social equals.26
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court continued its trend of separating
civil and social rights.27 The Plaintiff in Plessy was an African
American male who purchased a first class train ticket, but was
instructed by the train’s conductor to move to the second class
smoking car or disembark the train.28 Mr. Plessy argued that the
Louisiana state law that segregated railroad cars was unconstitutional.
The Court held that “equal, but separate” segregated rail coaches did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.29 The Court’s decision
demonstrates the fallacy of separate but equal; that first class cars were
“better” than second class ones is discernible from their descending
monikers and price. While Plessy intended to further separate civil
from social rights, it simultaneously demonstrated that blacks did not
have meaningful access to either type of right. Where Mr. Plessy
entered into a contract for a first class ticket, his race entitled him to
only a second class one. While subsequent decisions in the 1940s and
1950s found that black students were entitled to admission to various
graduate schools on equal protection grounds, the Supreme Court did
not overturn Plessy.30
Political and fundamental civil rights were also unavailable to
blacks in the first half of the Twentieth century. Many Southern states
disenfranchised African Americans by enacting “grandfather clauses,”
which made having an ancestor that was a legal citizen during slavery

25

Redlich, supra note 19, at 484.
Id.
27
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
28
Id. at 538.
29
Id. at 547.
30
See, e.g., Sipuel v. Bd of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948);
Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
26
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a requirement of voting.31 Others held whites-only primaries, which
the Supreme Court held were constitutional until its decision in Smith
v. Allwright in 1944. 32 Even freedom from enslavement was not
certain, and many African Americans agricultural workers returned to
virtual slavery in a system known as peonage. Black farm workers
toiled for money that was often printed by the plantation owners
themselves, and redeemable only at the plantation store.33 Another
common example of peonage was where plantation owners entered
into contracts with black farm workers with no intent to ever pay
them; the system endured well into the 1940s thanks to state statutes
that protected it.34
While peonage was common in the agricultural South, access to
civil, political, and social rights was far from easy in the North for
African Americans. Between 1880 and 1930, seventy-nine blacks were
lynched in the North.35 Racial riots were common, and the City of
Chicago allowed rioters to attack African Americans and their property
for four days until it intervened; over 500 people were injured.36
While the basic safety of African Americans may have improved
in the period after the Supreme Court found public segregation
unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education, that decision did not
immediately improve social rights for blacks.37 Many schools in
Northern and Midwestern states, such as Delaware and Missouri,
remained segregated well into the 1960s in violation of Brown.38 Even
where states complied with Brown, schools remained segregated due
31

Ogletree, supra note 22.
321 U.S. 649 (1944).
33
Ogletree, supra note 22.
34
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 233 (2004). See also Taylor v.
Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942) and Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944), holding
that Georgia and Florida peonage statues were unconstitutional.
35
Ogletree, supra note 22, at 503.
36
Id.
37
Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38
KLARMAN, supra note 34, at 347.
32
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to residential patterns, known as de facto segregation.39 De facto
segregation currently continues to deprive African American children
of education. A 1973 lawsuit attempted to remedy this problem in
Denver; however, the Supreme Court refused to find that de facto
segregation was a violation of Brown.40 In Keyes v. School District No.
1, the Supreme Court held that only segregation that results from
intentional government action (de jure segregation) violates Equal
Protection.41 Just recently, the Court held that school attendance
schemes in Seattle and Louisville intended to remedy de facto
segregation and provide the benefit of integrated schooling to all
students violated Equal Protection to white students under the
Fourteenth Amendment.42 In a vehement dissent, Justice Breyer
argued that the plurality decision broke the promise of Brown.43 “This
is a decision that the Court and the Nation will come to regret,” he
portended.44
In the decisions subsequent to Brown, the Court’s jurisprudence
maintained the racial status quo rather than remedied it. In 1976, the
Court in Washington v. Davis held that an Equal Protection violation
requires a “discriminatory purpose,” rather than merely a
discriminatory effect.45 As noted reparations scholar Charles Ogletree
pointed out, Justice Blackmun believed his colleagues misperceived
the state of racial inequality in the late 1980s.46 In Justice Blackmun’s
dissent from an opinion finding that a class of salmon cannery workers
failed to establish the racism they experienced in the workplace was a
constitutional violation in their employment, Blackmun described the
workers’ employment setting as being “organized on principles of
39

Id.
Redlich, supra note 19, at 496.
41
Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
42
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 S.
Ct. 2738, (2007).
43
Id. at 2837
44
Id.
45
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
46
Ogletree, supra note 22, at 498.
40
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racist stratification and segregation. In more blatant language, Justice
Stevens stated that the workplace conditions, responsibilities, and
housing were so inferior for black workers as to create a virtual
“plantation economy.”47 Justice Blackmun lamented, “[o]ne wonders
whether the majority still believes that race discrimination . . . is a
problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was.”48
The current collective consciousness of America and the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court embody the shortsightedness that
so disturbed Justice Blackmun. The country and the Court are laboring
under the myth of a post-racist society, as evidenced by the lack of
success of slavery reparations litigation. Reparation suits, which seek
restitution for slavery, are naturally met with hostility in a legal system
that refuses to acknowledge the continuing effects of slavery on the
black community. In light of the legal history recounted here, one feels
the same incredulity that Justice Blackmun did when Judge Posner
stated in Slave Descendants that African Americans could have
successfully brought reparations claims within the early part of the last
century.49 In which Twentieth Century court would African Americans
have had meaningful access to restitution for slavery: that which
denied their most basic rights, or that which pretended they have
always had those rights?
III. HISTORY OF REPARATIONS
In order to understand the significance of the Slave Descendants
decision, we must explore its place in the continuum of reparations
jurisprudence. Reparations refers to any legal or political scheme that
1) provides payment (in cash, trust, or social programs) to a large
group of claimants, 2) based on wrongs permitted under the law at the
time, 3) which current law may bar through a strict application of
sovereign immunity, statute of limitations or standing, and 4) which
47

Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989).
Id.
49
In re African American Slave Descendants Litigation (“Slave
Descendants”), 471 F. 3d 754, 762 (7th Cir. 2006).
48
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principles of corrective justice and restitution justify.50 The third part
of its definition demonstrates that reparations are a problematic
pursuit. The traditional paradigm of a plaintiff recovering from a
defendant that wronged her in the recent past works poorly where
defendant’s wrong is a systematic denial of plaintiff’s access to civil,
political, and social rights and opportunities, for the purpose of
preserving defendant’s sociopolitical dominance over plaintiff.51
Reparations suits arise from abhorrent wrongs. Past cases include
class action litigation for recovery from the government for the
internment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II, and
claims against German companies for their unjust profits from the use
of slave labor during the same time.52 The difficulty of success in
reparations suits demonstrates that courts often do not believe that the
gravity of such injuries outweigh legal formalities such as statutes of
limitations.53 However, these lawsuits resulted in legislation or extrajudicial agreements for restitution each in the amount of more than one
billion dollars.54
Courts summarily dismissed early African American reparations
litigation. In Johnson. v. McAdoo, plaintiffs were former slaves and
descendants of slaves that sought an equitable lien on U.S. Treasury
funds acquired during slavery from cotton taxes.55 In one short
paragraph, the court held that the true defendant was not the U.S.
Treasurer, as named in the suit, but instead the U.S. government,
which was immune from suit.56
50

Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other
Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 691 (2003).
51
Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and
African American Claims, 40 B. C. L. REV. 477, 488 (1998).
52
Hohri v. United States., 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 782 F. 2d 227 (1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 64 (1987), on remand, 847 F. 2d
779 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988); D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F. 3d
78 (2d Cir. 2001).
53
Id.; see also, Slave Descendants.
54
Yamamoto, supra note 51, at 696, Tables 1 and 2.
55
Johnson v. McAdoo, 45 App. D. C. 440 (1916).
56
Id. at 441.
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Subsequent suits were also unsuccessful. In an unreported
decision, the Northern District of California dismissed plaintiff’s claim
to the 40 acres and a mule, or the cash equivalent, guaranteed to his
descendants by the Freedman’s Bureau after the Civil War.57 It
reasoned that plaintiff’s case reinforced the need for statutes of
limitations in order to “prevent surprises through the revival of
claims.”58 One year later, the same court dismissed a claim against the
United States for damages from slavery, which the Ninth Circuit
affirmed on the grounds of sovereign immunity, lack of standing, and
statute of limitations.59 In Cato v. United States, the plaintiffs
analogized their claim to Native American reparations claims in which
the statute of limitations was tolled for far longer than plaintiffs
requested, but the court differentiated the African American plaintiffs
because they did not have an analogous treaty relationship with the
federal government.60 The court concluded that continuing
discrimination did not toll the statute of limitations, either.
More recently, plaintiffs brought a suit seeking restitution for
slavery pursuant to the Civil Liberties Act (“CLA”), an act which
Congress intended to remedy the injustice of Japanese-American
internment during World War II.61 Plaintiffs claimed that denying their
claims under the CLA violated the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.62 The court held that
the CLA barred claims of non-Japanese citizens and the act survived
judicial scrutiny.63 It reasoned that there are many other groups that
have been wronged by the “unhappy aspects of American history” that
57

Berry v. United States, No. C-94-0796-DLJ, 1994 WL 374537 at *3 (N.D.
Cal. 1994).
58
Id.
59
Cato v. United States, 70 F. 3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1995).
60
Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for
Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 513 (2003).
61
Obadele v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 432 (Fed. Cl. 2002), affirmed per
curium, 61 Fed. Appx. 705 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
62
Id. at 441.
63
Id.

541
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/4

10

Lutz: The Death Knell Tolls for Reparations in <em>In re African-Americ

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

the CLA does not address, and so the Act’s application to Japanese
Americans did not extend to African Americans.64
Those “unhappy aspects of American history” were the cause of a
reparations suit based on a race riot in Tulsa, Oklahoma in
1921.Though not a slavery reparations case the plaintiffs in Alexander
v. Oklahoma did argue that the court should apply an equitable tolling
doctrine to claims barred by statute of limitations. Alexander
demonstrates the difficulty experienced by plaintiffs in even the
strongest and most recent reparations cases.65 A young African
American male had been accused of assaulting a white teenage girl.66
Fearing a lynching, about fifty black residents of the African American
neighborhood in Tulsa, known as Greenwood, went to the jail to stop
it.67 White residents of Tulsa confronted the Greenwood citizens at the
courthouse and a melee ensued.68 In response, the police department
deputized and armed hundreds of white men with machine guns, and
the mayor of Tulsa called in the National Guard.69 The deputized
citizens and the Guardsmen invaded Greenwood in an attempt to
destroy it.70 A small group of Black World War I veterans attempted to
defend their neighborhood.71 The Guardsmen fired on the town with a
machine gun mounted to the top of a truck.72 The next day, conditions
worsened.73 The Guardsmen arrested and transported the residents of
Greenwood to buildings for “protective custody,” while the white
deputies burned the newly emptied homes and businesses.74 According
to the court’s findings of fact, the “angry white mob converged on
64

Id. at 442.
See Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F. 3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004).
66
Id. at 1211-12.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
65
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Greenwood in a devastating assault . . . killing up to three hundred
people, and leaving thousands homeless.”75 When the mob finished, it
had burned forty-two square blocks of Greenwood to the ground.76
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the court should apply an
equitable tolling doctrine to the statute of limitations. They claimed
that they could not have discovered the full involvement of the city of
Tulsa—which was responsible for deputizing and arming the mob, and
for arresting the citizens of Greenwood—until it investigated the
events and published a report in 2001.77 The court found that the
plaintiffs knew of their injury at the time it happened, and that the
plaintiff did not need to know the cause of the injury to trigger the
statute of limitations.78 The court advised that plaintiffs must use
reasonable diligence in discovering the facts giving rise to a claim.79
However, the court did not address the fact that during the statutory
period closely following the riot, Tulsa promised to compensate the
victims, but then ignored their requests for compensation.80 Nor did it
address how a 1920s court in Oklahoma would have realistically
received such claims in light of African Americans’ lack of meaningful
access to courts at that time.

75

Id.
Id. at 1212.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1216.
79
Id.
80
Ogletree, supra note 22, at 571.
76
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IV. SLAVE DESCENDANTS OPINIONS
A. District Court Opinion
1. Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs81 consisting of former slaves alleging post-Civil War
enslavement, representatives of slaves, and descendants of slaves, filed
nine separate suits in varied jurisdictions seeking reparations on behalf
of all African Americans against Defendant companies for their
involvement in slavery.82 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transferred the suits to the Northern District of Illinois for consolidated
proceedings, at which point Plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint. 83
In that complaint, Plaintiffs sought relief in the form of an accounting,
disgorgement of profits, restitution, compensatory damages, punitive
damages, and the creation of a historical commission to study the
actions of Defendant companies and their predecessors in interest.84
Plaintiffs also requested that the court disburse monetary awards into a
constructive public trust.

81

Plaintiffs are Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, Mary Lacey Madison, Andre
Carrington, John Bankhead, as administrator of the Estate of Edlee Bankhead,
Richard Barber, Sr., Hannah Hurdle-Toomey, as administrator of the Estate of
Andrew Jackson Hurdle, Marcelle Porter, as administrator of the Estate of Hettie
Pierce, Julie Mae Wyatt-Kervin, the Estate of Emma Marie Clark, Ina Bell Daniels
Hurdle McGee, Cain Wall Sr., and Antoinette Harrell Miller.
82
In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 737
(N.D. Ill. 2005).
83
In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027,
1038 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
84
Defendants are FleetBoston Financial Corporation, CSX Corporation, Aetna
Inc., Brown Brothers Harriman & Company, New York Life Insurance Company,
Norfolk Southern Corporation, Lehman Brothers Corporation, Lloyd’s of London,
Union Pacific Railroad, JP Morgan Chase, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown
and Williamson, Liggett Group Inc., Canadian National Railway, Southern Mutual
Insurance Company, American International Group, and Loews Corporation.
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2. Plaintiffs Claims against Defendants
In their Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs
alleged the following: Defendants conspired to commit tortious acts;
converted the property rights slaves had in themselves; were unjustly
enriched through slave labor; fraudulently concealed a cause of action
for replevin from the estates of Plaintiffs; violated Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights to inherit and convey property by restricting
former slaves’ access to corporate records demonstrating Defendants’
participation in slavery; intentionally and negligently inflicted
emotional distress; and violated state consumer protection laws by
fraudulently concealing material facts regarding their involvement in
slavery from Plaintiff consumers.85
Plaintiffs alleged that the predecessors to Defendant banks made
loans to slave traders and collected customs duties on ships
transporting slaves.86 Defendant railroads are successors-in-interest to
railroad lines that were allegedly constructed, in part, by slave labor,
and that transported slaves.87 Predecessors to Defendant insurance
companies allegedly issued insurance policies on the lives of slaves
with slave owners as beneficiaries and insured ships transporting
slaves.88 Defendant Brown Brothers Harriman allegedly accepted
slaves as collateral for loans, eventually owning up to 346 slaves.89
Significantly, Plaintiffs alleged in most counts that Defendants
performed these acts in violation of Northern laws applicable to them
at the time, and that Defendants made intentional misrepresentations
about their involvement in slavery.90

85

Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint at ¶ 258-366, In re AfricanAmerican Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 737 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
86
Id. at ¶ 125-223.
87
Id. at ¶ 125-223.
88
Id.
89
Id. at ¶ 148.
90
Id. at ¶ 125-223.
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3. Holdings
In his opinion for the Northern District of Illinois, Judge Norgle
dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.91 He held that Plaintiffs
lacked standing because they did not establish “to a virtual certainty
that they have suffered concrete, individualized harms at the hands of
Defendants,”92 and because their claim to their ancestor’s lost wages
was “conjectural.”93 Plaintiffs also lacked standing, according to Judge
Norgle, because their Complaint did not allege a sufficient causal
connection between the named Defendants’ acts and Plaintiffs’
ancestors,94 and because Plaintiffs may not assert the legal rights of
third-parties by virtue of their ancestry alone.95
Judge Norgle agreed with Defendants that the political question
doctrine and various statutes of limitations barred Plaintiffs’ claims.
He held that the issue of reparations was not justiciable because it is
political in nature, and the legislative branch acted on the issue when
it, for example, created the Freedman’s Bureau, ratified the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and
enacted numerous Civil Rights Acts.96 Even if it were justiciable, he
held that the statutes of limitations on all but the consumer protection
fraud claims would have accrued by 1865 at the latest, and that
Plaintiffs did not give “concrete instances of material representations
that have been made by Defendants” within the statutory periods.97
Judge Norgle declined to toll or delay the accrual of the statutes of
limitations because “Plaintiffs’ ancestors knew or should have known
[either while they were slaves or in the years after Emancipation] that
they were being brutalized and wrongfully forced to work,” and the
91

In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 737
(N.D. Ill. 2005).
92
Id. at 747 (internal quotations omitted).
93
Id. at 748-9.
94
Id. at 753.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 756-9.
97
Id. at 773.
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defendants did not conceal the injury of slavery because it was “quite
obvious when inflicted.”98
B. Seventh Circuit Opinion
Judge Posner, in a succinct nine-page opinion for the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, modified in part and reversed in part the
ruling of the district court.99 He held that the political question
doctrine did not bar Plaintiffs’ claims because Plaintiffs sought
“conventional legal relief” from the court by asking it to apply state
and federal law to Defendants’ conduct.100 However, he dismissed
without prejudice all of the claims in the complaint for lack of
standing, save for those of the representatives of the slaves.101 He
reasoned that Plaintiffs could not possibly connect Defendants’
wrongful acts with their financial harm, and the causal chain would be
so long that a court would merely be speculating as to the amount of
damages.102 Judge Posner reached the merits of the claims of plaintiffs
representing the estates of former slaves, holding that, as actual slaves,
they did have a concrete injury that granted them standing to sue.103
However, he dismissed their claims with prejudice as time-barred by
the statute of limitations.104
According to Judge Posner, tolling doctrines do not apply because
they cannot extend the time to sue by more than a century.105 He
reasoned that in the years immediately following the Civil War former
slaves could have received a fair hearing on these matters in Northern
courts, and that the descendants of slaves have had decades of
98

Id. at 776-9.
In re African American Slave Descendants Litigation (“Slave
Descendants”), 471 F. 3d 754, 763 (7th Cir. 2006).
100
Id. at 758.
101
Id. at 763.
102
Id. at 759.
103
Id. at 762.
104
Id.
105
Id.
99
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effective access to courts in the South.106 However, he reversed the
dismissal of the consumer protection fraud claims.107 In a consumer
fraud protection claim, where a seller misrepresents information
material to some class of buyers fearing he will lose those buyers if
they knew the truth, he perpetrates a fraud on those buyers.108 Judge
Posner remanded the consumer protection fraud claims for further
proceedings to determine whether Defendants misrepresented
information regarding their involvement in slavery to Plaintiffs,
causing them to purchase products they would not have purchased
otherwise.109
V. VARIOUS TOLLING DOCTRINES
A. Equitable Estoppel
Plaintiffs argued that the court should impose one of the various
tolling doctrines to their time-barred claims.110 One such tolling
doctrine is the “discovery rule.” According to Judge Posner in Cada v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., the discovery rule does not actually toll, or
halt, the statute of limitations, but instead delays its commencement
“from the date when the plaintiff is wronged to the date when he
discovers he has been injured.”111 A doctrine “within the domain of the
discovery rule”112 is equitable estoppel, where the defendant takes
steps to conceal the injury to the plaintiff, thus delaying the accrual of
the statute of limitations until the time when “the plaintiff has
discovered . . . or should have discovered, that the defendant injured
him.”113 The defendant is estopped from defending the claim on the
106

Id.
Id. at 763.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 773.
111
920 F. 2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990).
112
Id.
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Id.
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grounds that the statute of limitations bars plaintiff’s recovery.114 A
court may apply equitable estoppel when the plaintiff was not aware of
his injury at the time it occured.115
According to Judge Posner in Williams v. Sims, 116 the Seventh
Circuit outlined a “standard example” of equitable estoppel in Bell v.
City of Milwaukee.117 In Bell, the court found that on the evening of
February 2, 1958, two white Milwaukee police officers shot an
unarmed African American man who fled from them after they
attempted to arrest him for driving with a broken tail-light.118 One
officer allegedly stated to the other, “He’s just a damn nigger kid
anyhow.”119 According to the court, the officers planted a knife on the
victim, Bell, and claimed that he brandished the knife and confessed to
a robbery while fleeing.120 Additional police officers allegedly entered
into a racially-motivated conspiracy to conceal the crime.121 Bell’s
siblings filed suit against the alleged conspirators in 1979 for civil
rights violations and various tort claims. Defendants argued that the
statutes of limitations for Plaintiffs’ claims expired in 1961 and
1964.122 The court estopped Defendants from defending on the ground
that the statutes of limitations had expired because Plaintiffs alleged
that Defendants actively and fraudulently concealed their wrongdoing.
It held that equitable estoppel is a “far-reaching doctrine” and that the
key inquiry in determining whether it should apply is whether “the
defendants’ conduct and representations were so unfair and misleading
as to outbalance the public’s interest in setting a limitation on bringing
an action.”123 The court held that the public had a stronger interest in
114

Id.
Id.
116
390 F. 3d 958, 958 (7th Cir. 2004).
117
746 F. 2d 1205, 1229-31 (7th Cir. 1984) (reversed on other grounds).
118
Id. at 1216.
119
Id.
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Id at 1223.
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Id.
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Id at 1229
123
Id at 1231.
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seeing Plaintiffs’ claims litigated than in imposing the statute of
limitations because, if true, Defendants’ racially-motivated actions
were so unfair as to carve out an exception to the statue of
limitations.124 Bell demonstrated that courts should balance the
interests of the public in punishing Defendant’s wrongdoing with the
public’s interest in applying the statute of limitations.
B. Equitable Tolling
On the other hand, if the plaintiff knew he was injured and did not
file a claim within the applicable statute of limitations, equitable
tolling may be available to him. Judge Posner explained in Cada, if the
plaintiff reasonably “cannot obtain information necessary to decide
whether the injury is due to wrongdoing and, if so, wrongdoing by the
defendant,” he may appeal to the doctrine of equitable tolling to toll
the statute of limitations for the period of time necessary to obtain the
information.125 In Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. of New York v.
Howard Savings Bank, Judge Posner explained, “equitable tolling does
not require that the defendant have borne any responsibility for the
plaintiff's having missed the deadline.”126 Thus, equitable tolling
applies where plaintiff knew he was injured when it happened, and
equitable estoppel applies where plaintiff did not discover he was
injured until well after the injury occurred.
VI. ANALYSIS OF TOLLING DOCTINES IN SLAVE DESCENDANTS
Both the trial court and Judge Posner conceive of Plaintiffs’
injuries as slavery. The trial court refers to Plaintiffs’ injuries as “the
institution of slavery itself,” and states that Plaintiffs “knew or should
have known that they were being brutalized and wrongfully forced to
work for people, plantations, companies, and industries without being
124

Id.
Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F. 2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990).
126
Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Howard Sav. Bank, 436 F.3d 836, 839
(7th Cir. 2006).
125
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compensated.” Judge Posner echoes this sentiment when he declines to
apply tolling doctrines in one brief paragraph:
It is true that tolling doctrines can extend the time to sue
well beyond the period of limitations—but not to a century
and more beyond. Slaves could not sue, and even after the
Thirteenth Amendment became effective in 1865 suits such
as these, if brought in the South, would not have received a
fair hearing. However, some northern courts would have
been receptive to such suits, and since the defendants are
(and were) northern companies, venue would have been
proper in those states. Even in the South, descendants of
slaves have had decades of effective access to the courts to
seek redress for the wrongs of which they complain. And
it's not as if it had been a deep mystery that corporations
were involved in the operation of the slave system.127
Judge Posner’s assessment of African American access to courts
seems revisionist, at best. The history of slavery in the North in the
decades preceding the Civil War renders suspect Judge Posner’s
reasoning that freed slaves would have received fair reparations trials
there.128 It is doubtful that in states such as New York, which was the
locus of a massive international slave trading post, courts would have
been receptive to claims by blacks against those slave traders for
reparations. Furthermore, in light of numerous twentieth century
Supreme Court decisions recounted in this article which denied
African Americans their most basic rights, and failed to redress the
harms which still stem from a denial of those rights, it seems naïve to
believe that any court in the North or South would have been receptive
to reparations claims. After all, there has never been a successful
reparations suit.
127

In re African American Slave Descendants Litigation (“Slave
Descendants”), 471 F. 3d 754, 762 (7th Cir. 2006).
128
Note the October, 2005 exhibit of the New York Historical Society
“Slavery in New York” which deems New York the “capital of American Slavery”
for two centuries on the exhibit’s website: www.slaveryinnewyork.org.
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Of significance here, however, is how Judge Posner
mischaracterizes Plaintiffs’ injuries in the same manner the trial court
did. He states that Plaintiffs have had “decades of effective access to
the courts to seek redress for the wrongs of which they complain.”129
To bring any complaint into court, a plaintiff must know she has been
injured. By rejecting Plaintiffs’ appeal to the court to apply one of the
various tolling doctrines by stating that Plaintiffs should have brought
their claim earlier, Judge Posner is also assuming that Plaintiffs’ injury
is slavery. Judge Posner essentially concludes that since Plaintiffs
knew they were enslaved, they therefore cannot seek refuge in any of
the various tolling doctrines.
The African American slavery reparations cases mentioned in this
article seek compensation for the institution of slavery generally, so
Judge Posner’s conclusion is understandable, though inappropriate.
Unlike prior reparations cases, Plaintiffs here do not seek redress
merely for the institution of slavery—an institution that was legal in
the South prior to the Civil War. Plaintiffs claim that Defendant
companies violated Northern laws against slavery by engaging in the
business of slavery, and in some cases, actually owning slaves. This
injury is significantly different from the injury of legal slavery,
because it changes how the court should apply the various tolling
doctrines.
Arguably, a court could properly apply equitable tolling if the
injury is legal slavery. Equitable tolling is appropriate where a plaintiff
knew she was injured, but could not reasonably find out within the
statute of limitations that the injury was the result of wrongdoing, and
if so, that defendant committed the wrong. Plaintiffs knew they were
legally enslaved. However, Northern companies, such as Defendants,
could not own slaves, despite its legality in the South. If Defendants
committed such a wrong, and Plaintiffs could not reasonably find out
within the statute of limitations that their enslavement was the result of
Defendants’ illegal involvement in slavery, equitable tolling could
apply.

129

Slave Descendants, 471 F. 3d at 762.
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The stronger argument is that the injury Plaintiffs complain of is
illegal slavery, though, since Plaintiffs state in their complaint that
Defendants were Northern companies engaged in slavery in violation
of Northern laws. Equitable tolling does not apply where the injury is
illegal, rather than legal, slavery. Plaintiffs argue in their complaint
that they could not determine Defendant’s illegal involvement in
slavery because Defendants concealed that information. Thus, if the
injury is illegal slavery, and Plaintiffs could not find out Defendants
illegally enslaved them, Plaintiffs could not discover the existence of
their injury. Equitable tolling applies only where a plaintiff knows she
is injured, and Plaintiffs here claim they did not know about
Defendants’ involvement in slavery. This analysis does not apply to
equitable estoppel, however, where the plaintiff is unaware that her
injury exists because defendant concealed the injury.
Only Judge Posner’s final reason for rejecting tolling doctrines,
that “it’s not as if it had been a deep mystery that corporations were
involved in the operation of the slave system,” alludes to equitable
estoppel. By implying that Plaintiffs should have known that
corporations (and thus, Defendants) engaged in the business of
slavery, Judge Posner considers the possibility that the moment when
the statute of limitations accrued was not the time in which Plaintiffs
were legally subjugated by the institution of slavery, but was instead
when Plaintiffs discovered that Defendants, who were Northern
companies, allegedly illegally partook in, and profited from, the
institution of slavery in violation of Northern laws.
As Judge Posner considers, the injury here is not that Southern
plantation owners or Southern companies, for whom it was
unfortunately legal to own and trade slaves, enslaved Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants were unjustly enriched by their illegal
involvement in the slave trade, including slave ownership. If the illegal
ownership of slaves and illegal involvement in the slave trade caused
injury to Plaintiffs, and, as Plaintiffs claim, they could not discover
this injury because Defendants concealed their involvement, then the
statute of limitations did not accrue until Defendants’ recent
disclosures. However, Judge Posner neglects to instruct the trial court
to investigate the possible misconduct by Defendants that deprived
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Plaintiffs of legal recovery on the grounds that lots of companies
profited from slavery, so Defendants probably did, too.
Such an assertion renders accrual-centered tolling doctrines
toothless. At best, Judge Posner’s assertion assumes that Defendants’
profits were made legally, and thus ignores the substance of the injury
in Plaintiffs’ complaint. At worst, Judge Posner acknowledges that
Defendants likely engaged in illegal slavery, and completely ignores
their wrongdoing.
Determining whether several of the nation’s most well-known and
often-patronized corporations fraudulently concealed their illegal
involvement in slavery both to escape prosecution in the Nineteenth
Century and to maintain their relationship with consumers in the
Twentieth Century is of enormous public interest, especially where
such a lawsuit seeks to certify more than ten percent of the public as
members of the plaintiff-class. Although Judge Posner asserts that Bell
v. Milwaukee presented the “standard” for determining whether
equitable estoppel applies, he ignored its balancing test. Bell requires
the court to balance the gravity of Defendants’ wrongdoing with the
public interest in setting finite periods for timely claims.130 However,
instead of considering the public interest in discovering the validity of
Plaintiffs claims against the well-known and widely-patronized
Defendants, Judge Posner completely ignores Plaintiffs’ allegations of
Defendants’ fraudulent concealment. If Plaintiffs here “should have
known” that corporations, including Defendants, engaged in the
business of slavery in violation of Northern laws, then Plaintiffs in
Bell should have known that in the 1950’s white police officers would
protect fellow white officers who murdered a man because he was
black. As Bell demonstrates, such assertions are immaterial. According
to the Bell standard, Judge Posner should have considered whether, if
Defendants did conceal their illegal involvement in slavery from
Plaintiffs, that act was so unfair that the public interest demands an
exception to be carved out of the statute of limitations.
Furthermore, if Plaintiffs should have known that Defendants
engaged in the business of slavery, it begs the question, why remand
130

Bell v. City of Milwaukee,746 F. 2d 1205, 1231 (7th Cir. 1984).
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the consumer protection fraud claims for a trial on whether Defendants
actively prevented Plaintiffs from obtaining information on
Defendants’ involvement in slavery? In order to prevail on such a
claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Defendant sellers
misrepresented information material to a class of buyers, including
Plaintiffs, fearing they would lose those buyers if they knew about
Defendants’ involvement in slavery. The consumer protection claim
presupposes that such a class of buyers does not generally know that
corporations it patronizes engaged in the business of slavery. Not only
does Judge Posner fail to impose the proper balancing test in
determining whether equitable estoppel should apply, he contradicts
his own reason for its inapplicability by remanding the consumer
protection fraud claims.
Discovery and evidence similar to that in a consumer fraud claim
would result from a hearing on the issue of whether Defendants should
be estopped from defending Plaintiff’s claim as time-barred by the
statute of limitations because both involve evidence of what
Defendants did or did not conceal from Plaintiffs. Given the equitable
nature of both Plaintiffs’ claims of unjust enrichment and the
applicable tolling doctrines, in addition to concerns for judicial
efficiency and equity, Judge Posner should have remanded the
equitable estoppel issue to the trial court pending a hearing on
Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations.
Reparations are restitutional in nature, thus, they are focused on
removing from the defendant the spoils of his unjust enrichment. As
such, the issue of Defendant misconduct demanded a hearing. In Slave
Descendants, Plaintiffs sought to establish a public trust with
Defendants’ disgorged profits, not to receive a personal financial
benefit. Plaintiffs desired a forum in which Defendants’ involvement
in slavery would be made public, rather than to simply receive
compensation, because it is in the public interest to know what
Defendants actually did. The issue of causation is far more
problematic in the case of reparations claims than it is when Plaintiffs’
injuries are recent as with consumer fraud claims. Where Plaintiffs can
more easily prove causation because less time has passed, Defendants
have more incentive to settle and avoid an adverse judgment and
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public scrutiny. Thus, notwithstanding the surviving consumer fraud
protection claim, Plaintiffs may never receive evidence of Defendants’
illegal involvement in slavery without the discovery phase of an
equitable estoppel hearing.
Furthermore, the statute of limitations has been an insurmountable
hurdle thus far in reparations cases. Though it is possible that Plaintiffs
would not be able to prove a causal connection between their injury
and Defendants’ conduct at trial, an application of equitable estoppel
in Slave Descendants would have provided a powerful precedent for
future reparations claims. As in the case of the Tulsa riots claim, not
all African American reparations claims are based on slavery.
Reparations cases based on twentieth century harms, where the statute
of limitations expired more recently, do not shoulder the same burden
of causation that do slavery reparations cases. As with the Tulsa suit,
however, courts often dismiss as time-barred reparations cases based
on more recent injuries. A hearing on equitable estoppel for an injury
that occurred over a century ago would demonstrate the truly farreaching nature of equitable estoppel, and could provide dispositive
precedent for more recent reparations claims.
CONCLUSION
Judge Posner’s opinion in Slave Descendants gets it wrong with
respect to both the law and the history it relies on. His opinion fails to
consider the history of Northern involvement in slavery and the
enduring nature of slavery and racism on both Northern and Southern
courts. It also fails to apply the proper standard for equitable estoppel.
Instead of providing precedent for other reparations suits plagued by
statute of limitations problems, Slave Descendants supports the
proposition that African Americans have never had access to a judicial
remedy for slavery. Denied the solace of tolling doctrines such as
equitable estoppel, future reparations litigation may abandon all hope
of remedying the harms of slavery and Jim Crow, and instead focus on
less problematic claims based on consumer fraud protection statutes.
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